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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, the adoption of face recognition for biometric authentication systems is usual, mainly be-
cause this is one of the most accessible biometric modalities. Techniques that rely on trespassing these
kind of systems by using a forged biometric sample, such as a printed paper or a recorded video of
a genuine access, are known as presentation attacks, but may be also referred in the literature as face
spoofing. Presentation attack detection is a crucial step for preventing this kind of unauthorized ac-
cesses into restricted areas and/or devices. In this paper, we propose a novel approach which relies in a
combination between intrinsic image properties and deep neural networks to detect presentation attack
attempts. Our method explores depth, salience and illumination maps, associated with a pre-trained
Convolutional Neural Network in order to produce robust and discriminant features. Each one of these
properties are individually classified and, in the end of the process, they are combined by a meta learn-
ing classifier, which achieves outstanding results on the most popular datasets for PAD. Results show
that proposed method is able to overpass state-of-the-art results in an inter-dataset protocol, which is
defined as the most challenging in the literature.
c© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The task of identifying a given individual by its physiological
traits (e.g., face, iris or fingerprint) or behavioral patterns (e.g.,
keystroke dynamics, gait) is known as biometrics. Due to the
major adoption of devices that rely on this kind of access, the
development of new techniques that seek to impersonate a legit-
imate user increased significantly, adding up major challenges
for security authentication systems. The process of attack a bio-
metric system is known in the literature as presentation attack,
but may also be referred as spoofing attack, and it consists in
present to the acquisition sensor a synthetic biometric sample,
containing the biometric pattern of a valid user, to authenticate
itself as a legitimate user.
In this work, we present a new tool named FaceSpoof Buster,
for detecting presentation attacks, without the needs of any ex-
tra hardware components (e.g., depth sensor, infrared sensor).
Using different intrinsic properties from a given biometric sam-
ple, the presented method reach great results, in comparison to
previous works in the literature, with recognizable results on the
task of classification on an unseen dataset, commonly known as
inter-dataset evaluation.
Our hypothesis is based on the fact that, by extracting these
intrinsic properties, such as depth, illumination, and saliency,
we may obtain telltales that may reveal additional information
about the authenticity from a given biometric sample.
Combining a Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and the
transfer learning process, we are able to extract robust and dis-
criminative features, which are combined with SVM classifiers
in a two step classification process, to perform the detection
of attack samples. Our method outperforms many existing ap-
proaches proposed for face presentation attack detection (PAD)
problem, with major emphasis on challenging tasks, such as the
inter-dataset evaluation.
We can summarize our main contributions as follows: (1)
proposition of a new method for face Presentation Attack De-
tection (PAD), named FaceSpoof Buster, which is based in a
combination between intrinsic image properties and deep neu-
ral networks; (2) evaluation of different intrinsic properties
(e.g., saliency, depth and illumination maps) for the problem
of PAD, which to the best of our knowledge, have never been
evaluated in this context; (3) an HTER that over overpass liter-
ature results in both inter and intra dataset protocol for different
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2public datasets; (4) effective application of a previously trained
CNN in a PAD context.
2. Related Works
Accordingly to Pan et al. (2008), the techniques for presen-
tation attack detection can be grouped into four major groups:
user behavior modeling, data-driven characterization, user co-
operation and hardware-based.
The techniques based on the first approach aims of recogniz-
ing presentation attacks by modeling the user’s behavior such
as head movements and eye blinking. Data-driven techniques
are based on finding artifacts of attempted attacks by exploiting
the data that came from a standard acquisition sensor. User co-
operation based techniques seek to detect presentation attacks
based on the interaction between the user and the authentication
system, such as asking the user to execute some movement.
Finally, there are techniques that use extra hardware, such as
depth sensors and infrared cameras, in order to obtain more in-
formation about the scenario and thus be able to find cues that
may reveal an attempted attack. Since this work focus on data-
driven techniques, the rest of this section will be focused on this
kind of methods.
Schwartz et al. (2011) presented an anti-spoofing method by
exploring the use of several visual descriptors for characteriz-
ing facial characteristics in terms of its color, texture, and shape
properties. To deal with the high dimensionality of the final
representation, the authors proposed the use of the Partial Least
Squares (PLS) classifier, a statistical approach for dimensional-
ity reduction and classification, which was designed to distin-
guish a genuine biometric sample from a fraudulent one.
d. S. Pinto et al. (2012) proposed a data-driven method for
video PAD based on Fourier analysis of the residual noise sig-
nature extracted from the input videos. The use of well-known
texture feature descriptors, such as Local Binary Patterns was
also considered in the literature by Mtt et al. (2011), which fo-
cuses on detecting micro-texture patterns that are added into
the fake biometric samples during the acquisition process. Ap-
proaches based on Differences of Gaussian (DoG) (Peixoto
et al., 2011a; Tan et al., 2010) and Histogram of Oriented Gra-
dients (HOG) (Komulainen et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013) were
also proposed, but at the cost of the results being affected by
illumination conditions and the capture sensor, due to their na-
ture.
Yeh and Chang (2018) proposed an effective approach againt
face presentation attacks, based on perceptual image quality as-
sessment, by adopting a Blind Image Quality Evaluatior (BIQE)
along with a Effectivate Pixel Similary Deviation (EPSD), in or-
der to generate new features to use on a multi-scale descriptor,
showing it’s efficacy when compared to previous works.
3. Proposed Method
This section provide details about proposed method and each
step of proposed framework. First step of proposed method will
perform the frame extraction from the videos, followed by the
extraction of intrinsic properties maps for each frame. Together,
these maps represent specific properties (depth, illumination,
and saliency) from a video along time.
Then, we use a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN),
specifically ResNet-50 (He et al. (2015)), as a feature extrac-
tor in a way to encode properties from previously encoded
maps. This process also takes advantage of a transfer learning
(Yosinski et al. (2014)) process, which uses previous ImageNet
weights, since the number of samples to train our network from
scratch is very restricted. Features extracted at this step are
named bottleneck features.
Once encoded, bottleneck features are classified using an
SVM classifier, which provide confidence degree for each
frame in an input video. These confidence scores are used in
a final stage, which perform a meta-learning process, to train a
new SVM classifier which combines information from illumi-
nation, depth and salience maps, resulting in a new artifact that
will be referred to as probabilities vector. This new probabili-
ties vector artifact is then fed to our second classifier, which is
responsible for the final prediction for the tested samples. Fig. 1
depicts an overview of full proposed method.
3.1. Frame extraction from videos
Most of the benchmarks available for the face presentation
attack detection problem are collections of videos, and for these
datasets, we first need extracts the frames of each video, since
the intrinsic property computation and the classification stage
is performed upon images. For this step, we perform a subsam-
pling by extracting 10 frames per second from each video.
3.2. Depth Maps
Due to the fact of presentation attacks being frequently repro-
duced over a flat surface, such as a sheet of paper with a printed
face, or over a tablet reproducing a valid access, we believe that
the depth estimation from a given biometric sample can provide
relevant information about its authenticity, once that when pre-
sented with a flat surface, the estimated depth map should differ
from real face.
Our method estimates depth maps using the approach pro-
posed by Godard et al. (2017), which uses stereo images and a
fully convolutional deep neural network associated with a mod-
ified loss function to estimates image depth. As in feature ex-
traction step, described in Section 3.5, here we also take ad-
vantage of transfer learning methodology, transferring weights
from Godard et al. (2017) method’s to our estimator.
3.3. Illumination Maps
In digital forensics field, illumination inconsistencies have
been constantly used to detect image forgeries (Carvalho et al.
(2016); d. Carvalho et al. (2013)). The hypothesis of these
works is that illumination is an important clue and very diffi-
cult to fake in authentication context.
Inspired by d. Carvalho et al. (2013) approach, we also use
illuminant maps to encode illumination information into PAD
context. Our hypothesis is that generated illumination maps
from a real face will show differences on its reflection when
compared to the generated illumination map from a flat surface.
This is similar to our hypothesis for the depth maps, but in this
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Fig. 1: Overview of the proposed method. Initially, we represent intrinsic properties by using different kinds of maps, followed by the bottleneck feature extraction
using the ResNet50 architecture; Followed by this, we perform the prediction of the previously extracted features, followed by the prediction of the probabilities;
lastly, we perform the classification of the stacked probabilities, in order to generate the final predictions, to decide whether a given facial biometric sample is
authentic or not.
case, focusing on the fact that a real human face shows a surface
that reflects in a different manner than a tablet or a sheet of
paper.
Based on the work proposed by Tan et al. (2008), our method
take advantage of Inverse Intensity-Chromaticity Space for es-
timating illuminant maps from a single image.
3.4. Saliency Maps
As in depth and illumination cases, our method also takes ad-
vantage of saliency information to encode valuable information
into our method. Again, our hypothesis is that flat objects used
in PAD will spoil quality in saliency estimation.
Our saliency maps estimation is based on Zhu et al. (2014)
which have two major steps: (1) a background modeling using
boundary connectivity, which characterizes the spatial layout
of image regions with respect to image boundaries; (2) a prin-
cipled optimization framework to integrate multiple low level
cues, including proposed background measure.
3.5. Bottleneck Features Extraction via ResNet50
Once our intrinsic properties are estimated, we perform an
alignment at eye’s level on all of our frames and their property
maps, followed by a crop on the face region. The purpose of
this extra step in to have all the frames normalized with the
same alignment.
Then, our method takes advantage of transfer learning pro-
cess Yosinski et al. (2014), in a way to avoid the process of la-
borious handcraft feature extraction. We choose ResNet50 (He
et al. (2015)), a robust, well known and effective CNN archi-
tecture, associated with ImageNet weights, to extract features
from previously generated maps. Removing top layer, we use
ResNet50 architecture as a feature extractor, which provides
feature vectors commonly known as bottleneck features.
As final output of this step, a feature vector of 2,048 dimen-
sions will be generated, which we will be later on referred as
bottleneck feature vector.
3.6. Classification
Adopting a two-step classification pipeline, in which the first
classifier is used for feature vectors classification, while the lat-
ter one is used for classifying the probabilities generated by the
first one, our method shows a major benefit when compared to
previous works. By allowing us to stack together many intrinsic
properties from a given frame, it’s also possible to make use of
additional information that may contribute to the task of PAD.
3.6.1. Bottleneck Vectors Classifier
For the task of bottleneck vectors classification, the adoption
of a Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Nasrabadi, 2007) classi-
fier was made, due to its robustness in the task of binary classifi-
cation when using multiple features. Given a bottleneck feature
vector, our classifier returns for each frame, the probability of
that frame being an attack or not.
3.6.2. Probability Feature Vector Assembly
Given an input video VP, which already have intrinsic prop-
erties estimated, composed by n frames f P1 , f
P
2 , · · · , f Pn , and
where I denotes the intrinsic property extracted from the video
(P ∈ {D, I, S}). In previous step (bottleneck vector classifier),
we calculated the probability of each frame belonging to a class
or another, denoted by f Pi .
Using a fusion based approach, we combine information
from all intrinsic image properties in a way to use all these
4information together, resulting in a probability feature vector
(p f v) defined by
p f v = {pD, pI , pS } (1)
where pP is given by
pP =
∑n
i=1 f
P
i
n
, P ∈ {D, I, S } (2)
3.6.3. Probabilities Classifier
As a final step of our classification pipeline, we proceed to
feed our p f v vectors into our second classifier, which will be
later on referred as probabilities classifier. For this task, another
SVM classifier was selected. As an output of this classification,
we will have the final classification for each video.
4. Experiments and Results
For evaluation of the proposed method, different rounds of
experiments were performed using three public anti-spoofing
datasets, which contained samples from real accesses and from
presentation attacks. The adoption of protocols focusing on
intra-dataset evaluation, where one dataset is tested within
the same scenario was performed by following the protocols
suggested by datasets’ creators. Evaluation between different
datasets scenarios, commonly known as inter-dataset, was also
conducted, in order to assess the performance of our method in
unknown scenarios.
It is also paramount to realize that, since we are interested in
evaluate the efficiency of each intrinsic property separately, fi-
nal results reported for depth, illumination and saliency reflects
a majority vote process among all the frames classified by the
first classifier (without probabilities features classification).
4.1. Datasets
In order to address the efficiency of the proposed method,
three publicly available anti-spoofing datasets were selected.
The criteria for selection of these datasets among many oth-
ers available was due to their major adoption in previous works
that tackle PAD.
4.1.1. Replay-Attack
Consisting of 1300 video clips from both photo and video
attacks from 50 subjects, the Replay-Attack dataset shows it-
self as a reliable dataset for the evaluation of our method, once
it is presented with different lighting and environment condi-
tions (Chingovska et al. (2012)). In this dataset, three different
types of attack are provided: print attacks, reproduced by using
a printed paper with the face of a legitimate user; mobile at-
tacks, reproducing a valid user access over a mobile phone; and
video attacks, similarly to the mobile attacks, but reproduced
with a tablet. The Replay-Attack dataset is separated into three
subsets: training set (containing 360 videos); development set
(containing 360 videos); testing set (containing 480 videos);
and enrollment set (containing 100 videos);
4.1.2. CASIA-FASD
The CASIA-FASD dataset proposed by Zhang et al. (2012)
contains a total amount of 600 videos from 50 different sub-
jects, created with the purpose of providing samples from many
of the existent types of presentation attacks. The videos are pre-
sented in twelve different scenarios, where each of them is com-
posed by three genuine accesses and three fraudulent from the
same person. Three different resolutions were used to capture
(low, normal and high), along with three different types of at-
tack (normal, printed attacks, printed and warped, printed with
cut on the eyes region and video-based attacks).
4.1.3. NUAA Photograph Imposter Dataset
The NUAA Photograph Imposter Dataset (Tan et al. (2010))
is composed of 15 subjects, comprising a total of 5,105 valid
access images and 7,509 presentation attacks collected through
a generic webcam at 20 fps with a resolution of 640 x 480 pix-
els. The subjects were captured over three sections in different
places and lighting conditions. The production of the attack
samples were made by shooting a high resolution photograph
with a Canon digital camera.
4.2. Experimental Protocols
In order to assess the performance of our method, we pro-
ceed the experiments by using two different protocols. The first
one, consists in evaluates proposed method inside the same anti-
spoofing dataset, which is commonly known as intra-dataset
evaluation. The second one was conducted in order to address
the efficacy of our method when tested on another dataset, com-
monly being referred as inter-dataset or cross-dataset evalua-
tion. This later one is the most challenging in the literature,
due to the differences in scenery that one dataset shows from
another one.
For the intra-dataset evaluation, the authors dataset protocols
were followed, in order to guarantee a better understanding of
how our method performs when compared to other works.
As for the evaluation of our method on a previously unseen
dataset, which is called inter-dataset, we followed the same pro-
tocols as defined by other previous works, where one database
was used as train set, and another one was used as test set. For
this evaluation, we also performed the combination between
multiple datasets, in order to create a model that comprises
characteristics from diverse scenarios and sensors, allowing us
to generalize our model to better perform on new datasets.
4.3. Experimental Setup
The parameters configurations used in this work are de-
scribed all over this section, in a way to provide an easy way
to reproduce the results obtained by our method.
Regarding the illumination maps and its segmentation, the
used parameters are the same as the presented in the work of
d. Carvalho et al. (2013). For the depth maps, the used param-
eters were also kept as default as proposed by Godard et al.
(2017). In the task of generating the saliency maps, default val-
ues were also used without any changes.
We conducted the classification process by using two differ-
ent classifiers. In the first one, our feature vectors classifier, an
5One-vs-Rest classifier was adopted using a Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM) with default parameter values. The second classi-
fier, used for predicting the class of a given set of probabilities,
was performed by using also an SVM classifier, with the adop-
tion of a Radial Basis Function (RBF) Kernel.
In this work, the major used frameworks were Keras (version
2.2.2) 1 and TensorFlow (1.5.0)23.
4.4. Intra-Dataset Evaluation
In this section, the results obtained for the intra-dataset eval-
uation are presented, in order to evaluate how our method per-
forms when testing within the same dataset. For the evalua-
tion of our method, we used the same protocols defined by the
databases authors, as well as the metrics proposed by them.
4.4.1. CASIA
In the evaluation of the CASIA dataset, the best overall re-
sult, in which all the attacks were evaluated together, was ob-
tained by using the illumination maps property solely, achieving
an HTER value of 3.88%. The usage of the concatenated maps
also showed great results for separated types of attack, such as
when evaluated on the tablet and print attack types, achieving
HTER values of 1.66% and 3.88%, respectively. Attacks per-
formed by using a printed sheet of paper with a cut in the eyes
region, the usage of the saliency maps showed great results,
with a HTER value of 6.94%.
Table 1 provide all the obtained results for the intra-dataset
evaluation on the CASIA-FASD database.
Table 1: Performance Results (in %) considering the Intra-Dataset Protocol for
the CASIA dataset.
Method Tablet Print Cut Overall
Depth 10.27 13.05 17.50 33.33
Illumination 5.00 8.33 10.00 3.88
Saliency 5.00 6.38 6.94 14.81
Concatenated 1.66 3.88 11.38 15.55
4.4.2. Replay Attack Dataset
As seen in the Table 2, the usage of the illumination maps
showed a great performance on the evaluation of the Replay
Attack dataset, with HTER values of 1.56%, 1.25%, 0.62% and
5.50% for High definition, Printed, Mobile and Overall attack
types.
4.4.3. NUAA
In Table 3, we display the results obtained for the intra-
dataset evaluation protocol in the NUAA dataset. We can ob-
serve that the usage of depth maps in this dataset plays a major
role on our performance results, achieving a HTER value of
20.75% and a BPCER value of 3.15%.
1https://keras.io
2https://www.tensorflow.org
3All the source code will be made freely available for usage and replication
of the method hereby presented, upon paper acceptance.
Table 2: Performance Results (in %) considering the Intra-Dataset Protocol for
the Replay Attack dataset.
Method Highdef Print Mobile All
Depth 30.93 16.87 22.81 31.62
Illumination 1.56 1.25 0.62 5.50
Saliency 10.62 11.87 5.93 12.62
Concatenated 10.00 7.50 10.00 10.75
Table 3: Performance Results (in %) considering the Intra-Dataset Protocol for
the NUAA dataset.
Method HTER APCER BPCER
Depth 20.75 38.36 3.15
Illumination 48.20 29.37 67.04
Saliency 34.20 27.89 41.11
Concatenated 44.36 28.27 60.45
4.5. Inter-Dataset Evaluation
Building a method that is highly adaptable from one face
anti-spoofing database to another unknown one has been posed
as a major challenge in previous works, and it’s an essential
ability for real world applications that rely on face recognition
for authentication. This task is posed as a major challenge due
to the differences in the scenery from a given database to an-
other, such as illumination, depth, as well as hardware based
configurations, such as capture sensor and camera processing.
In this section, we present the obtained results for the inter-
dataset evaluation protocol, when one dataset was used for
training and another was used for test.
4.5.1. CASIA
Using a fusion based approach, we were able to achieve state
of the art results for the CASIA dataset. By a combination of
two different anti-spoofing databases (NUAA and Replay At-
tack), we obtained an HTER value of 33.14%, as well as great
results with the classification of the intrinsic properties alone,
with HTER values of 36.82% and 39.32% for the depth and
illumination maps, respectively.
4.5.2. Replay Attack
On the evaluation of the Replay-Attack dataset, the best re-
sults were obtained when using a combination between the
CASIA-FASD and the NUAA databases, by making usage of
the illumination maps, resulting in a HTER value of 36.75%.
Good results were also achieved by using only the NUAA
dataset as train set along with the illumination maps, resulting
in a HTER value of 41.64%.
4.5.3. NUAA
On the task of classifying the NUAA dataset, the best re-
sults were obtained for the depth maps, with a HTER value of
37.27%, showing that this property, besides not performing so
well in the Replay-Attack and the CASIA databases, still shows
great potential for revealing cues that may indicate a presenta-
tion attack.
6Table 4: Performance Results (in %) considering the Inter-Dataset Protocol for
the CASIA dataset.
Train Set Method HTER APCER BPCER
NUAA
Depth 44.56 62.45 26.66
Illumination 55.34 84.01 26.66
Saliency 43.15 27.88 58.42
Concatenated 50.74 87.00 14.44
Replay
Attack
Depth 43.33 8.88 77.78
Illumination 50.18 0.30 100
Saliency 52.79 8.92 96.67
Concatenated 50.18 1.48 98.88
NUAA Depth 36.82 31.59 42.04Illumination 39.32 18.65 60.00
Replay
Attack
Saliency 61.84 37.17 86.51
Concatenated 33.14 46.29 20.00
Table 5: Performance Results (in %) considering the Inter-Dataset Protocol for
the Replay Attack dataset.
Train Set Method HTER APCER BPCER
NUAA
Depth 48.00 43.85 52.14
Illumination 41.64 3.28 80.00
Saliency 47.78 62.71 32.85
Concatenated 43.42 31.14 55.71
CASIA
Depth 53.00 22.25 83.75
Illumination 55.37 88.25 22.5
Saliency 61.25 91.25 31.25
Concatenated 60.35 80.00 40.71
NUAA Depth 47.62 27.75 67.50Illumination 36.75 51.00 22.50
CASIA Saliency 54.75 74.50 35.00
Concatenated 40.21 37.57 42.85
The usage of illumination maps also showed great results
when used as training sets the Replay-Attack dataset and a com-
bination between Replay-Attack and CASIA, achieving HTER
values of 51.13% and 50.51%, respectively.
5. Comparison with State-of-the-art
In table 7, we display the results obtained by using our ap-
proach, for both the property maps individually as well for
the concatenated ones. Significant results were achieved on
the task of inter-dataset classification, mostly on the CASIA-
FASD dataset, achieving an HTER value of 33.14% when
trained on the combination between the NUAA and the Replay-
Attack datasets, overcoming results obtained in previous works
(d. S. Pinto et al. (2012); Yang et al. (2014)). The usage of
property maps alone also showed great results for the CASIA
dataset, with HTER values of 36.82% and 39.32%, respectively.
Outstanding results were also achieved for the Replay-Attack
dataset when trained on the combination of NUAA and CASIA
databases, achieving HTER values of 36.75% when using the
Table 6: Performance Results (in %) considering the Inter-Dataset Protocol for
the NUAA dataset.
Train Set Method HTER APCER BPCER
CASIA
Depth 37.27 47.56 26.97
Illumination 50.88 11.66 90.09
Saliency 47.67 41.07 54.26
Concatenated 44.29 25.38 63.19
Replay
Attack
Depth 64.94 52.84 77.03
Illumination 51.13 3.39 98.86
Saliency 56.29 15.30 97.29
Concatenated 52.55 9.80 95.29
CBSR Depth 51.00 47.18 54.81Illumination 50.51 4.39 96.63
Replay
Attack
Saliency 60.26 33.52 86.99
Concatenated 50.61 17.12 84.10
Table 7: Comparison Among Existing Aproaches Considering the Inter-Dataset
Evaluation Protocol.
Method CASIA Replay-Attack NUAA
Yeh and Chang (2018) 39.00 38.10 -
Pinto et al. (2018) 47.16 49.72 -
Yang et al. (2014) 42.04 41.36 -
Patel et al. (2016) - 31.60 -
Tan et al. (2010) - - 45.85
Peixoto et al. (2011b) - - 49.85
Depth 36.82 47.62 37.27
Illumination 39.32 36.75 50.51
Saliency 43.15 47.78 47.67
Proposed Method 33.14 40.21 50.61
illumination maps, achieving near state of the art results for this
dataset.
6. Conclusions and Future Works
In this paper, we have proposed a method that, by using a
two-step classification model, along with intrinsic image prop-
erties, such as depth, illumination and saliency, is able to learn
features for the task of presentation attack detection.
Evaluating our method in three different databases, we over-
pass state-of-the-art results achieving a HTER value of 33.14%
for the CASIA-FASD dataset for the inter-dataset evaluation,
which addresses the efficacy of our method when compared to
previous works in the literature. This result, to the best of our
knowledge, is the best achieved for the CASIA dataset, setting
our method as the state of the art for this specific dataset.
We believe that the finds provided by this paper, such as the
efficacy of using image intrinsic properties, can lead to a better
understanding on the development of new anti-spoofing meth-
ods, as well as to provide better in the development of new
datasets.
For future works, we plan to make usage of other PAD
datasets, once we were able to achieve great results when com-
7bining more than one dataset for evaluation on the inter-dataset
protocol, leading to even better results which can help to ad-
dress how to tackle facial presentation attacks.
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